University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
2003

The Right to Remain Silent Helps Only the Guilty
Stephanos Bibas
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Criminology Commons,
Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Jurisprudence
Commons, and the Law and Society Commons

Repository Citation
Bibas, Stephanos, "The Right to Remain Silent Helps Only the Guilty" (2003). Faculty Scholarship at Penn
Law. 826.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/826

This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law:
Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

The Right to Remain Silent
Helps Only the Guilty
*
Stephanos Bib as

To TELL THE TRU TH . ... . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............. ... . . .... . . . . . ... ... ... . . ...423

I.

GUIL1Y SU SPECTS LIE

II.

CONCLUSION

III.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.426

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

431

In a recent issue of the Haroard Law Review, Professors Daniel Seidmann
and Alex Stein argue that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self
incrimination helps innocent defendants. It does so, they contend, by
encouraging guilty defendants to remain silent instead of concocting false
alibis.

Because j uries know that

guilty defendants will

Seidmann and Stein claim, j uries will

remain silent,

believe the alibis

of innocent

defendants at trial. Their argument rests on a game-theoretic account of
how rational defendants sh ould act during interrogation to maximize their
chances of success at trial . 1
Seidmann and Stein's elegant game-theoretic construct avails them
little, h owever, because their premises, methodology, and conclusion do not
mirror reality. Though their theory predicts that rational suspects will
2

remain silent, roughly eighty to ninety percent of suspects talk to the police.

Seidmann and Stein acknowledge this fact but dismiss it as irrational
behavior, because in their view rational suspects would remain silent in
1
preparation for trial.: They succumb to the temptation to ignore messy facts

*

Associate Professor, UniYersity of Iowa College of La\,·; former Assistam U.S. Attorney,

Division, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York
(bibas@philo.org). B.A., Columbia; B.A., M.A., Oxford; J.D., Yale. I am grateful to Mark Harris,
K}TOn Huigens, and Dan Richman for their comments on an earlier draft.
Criminal

l.
Daniel]. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence HeljJs the Innocent: A Game-Theoretic
Analysis of the Fifth Amenrl1nmt PJivilPge, 114 H.\R\'. L REV. 430 (2000).

2. /d. at 448 n.60 (acknowledging that somewhere between 9.5% and 20.88% of suspects
invoke the right to remain silent); infra note 23 (collecting statistics).

3.

Seidmann & Ste i n, sujmt note 1, at 447-48 & n.60.
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that do not fit their neat theoretical m odel . They, like m ost criminal
procedure scholars, m istakenly view trials as the center of the universe and
assume that rational suspects sh ould care mainly about m aximizing their
4
chances of success at trial. This academic obsession with trials bears little.
relationship to the real world, where only about 6% of felony defendants go
_
to trial and most plead guilty." We live in a world of guilty pleas, not t rials,
and in this world suspects have many options more desirable than figh ting
the government's case at trial. Suspects who think that they can divert
suspicion may throw off the scent by concocting alibis. Th ose w h o expect to
be convicted can earn favorable plea bargains by confessing early and
perhaps doing undercover work against their co-conspirators . For most
suspects, these other options are m ore attractive than remaining silent and
gambling everything on a small chance of acquittal at trial .
I n short, Seidmann and Stein err i n viewing interrogation a s a mere
prelude to the inevitable trial and foc using on the latter. Instead, I will focus
on the interrogation in its own right and the two options that Seidmann and
Stein dismiss as irrational. Part I analyzes what happens if guilty suspects
confess the truth . It shows that c onfessing brings psychic benefits, reductions
in charges and sentences, and swift resolutions. Hence, many rational
suspects do c onfess instead of remaining silent. Part II looks at the many
suspects who lie under questioning and shows that lying is often a rational
response. ·when lies succeed, the payoff of diverting investigators' suspicions
is enormous. Because of this incentive, many suspects currently lie. They
thereby pool with innocent suspects and prevent innocent defendants ' alibis
from being taken at face value, undercutting Seidmann and Stein ' s claim to
the contrary. In short, Seidmann and Stein' s m odel does not track observed
real-world outcomes because it ignores many alternatives that are preferable
to fighting the government at trial. They rely on an overly t heoretical
methodology and incorrect assu mptions about the costs and benefits of
confessing. As a result, they concl ude that guilty defendants will remain
silent, when in fact most defendants talk. Seidmann and Stein ' s theoretical
approach typifies criminal procedure ' s broader, outmoded preoccupation
with trials and its failure to focus on the real world.

-t.

/rl. at

442-47 (discussing at length ho1,· damaging at trial silence would be, how triers

of f�1ct 1\·ould interpret iL. and how it would affect a suspect's entire trial strategy).
:J.

See BL-REAI.' OF jt'ST!CE ST.-\TISTICS, L'.S.

DEP'T

OF jL:STICE, SOLRC:EBOOK OF CRI�II'\;.-\L

JLSTICE ST->.TISTICS 1999, at 460 tbl.5.b2 (reponing that a 1996 sun-ey of the seven c:·-five largest
u rba n counties in Amerie<t found that only

l%

of state felony defendants 1vere acquitted after

trial, 5% \\·ere comicted at trial, the cases of �9% were dismissed, and 66% pleaded guilty (the
tutals do not add u p to 100% because of rounding)); irl. at '132 tbl.S.32 (reporting that in 1999
only 1.4% of federal felony defendants were

ac quitted

after trial, 4.3% were com1cted after

trial, the cases of 10.4% ,,·ere dismissed, ancl83.9% pleaded guilty or nolo contendere).

_

·

·
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I . To TELL THE TRUTH
Traditional analyses of the right to remain silent , Seidmann and Stein
note, take a moral and philosophical appro ac h . Traditional analyses assume
that the right protects guilty defendants ' privacy and liberties at the expens e
of effi cient c rime control; they then debate the pros and cons of protecting
!i
Seidmann and Stein question the conventional
gui lty defendants.
assumption that the right helps only guilty defendants. They reject empirical

analvsis of this question because little evidence is available and because
7
futu�e criminals may not beh ave the way past ones h ave.
Instead, Seidmann and Stein construct a game-theoretical behavioral

mo del of how rational guilty and innocent defendants would react to
questioning. As they put it, only "a relatively h igh level of [theoretical]
abstraction" can produce a determinate explanation of how suspects
8
behave. They suppose that interrogated guilty suspects h ave two basic
choices. First, suspects may ch oose to remain silent, which leads police to
assume that they are guilty and focus their investigations on confirming their
guilt. The right to remain silent prevents juries from inferring guilt based on
silence; othenvise, guilty suspects would h ave to concoct lies to avoid adverse
jury inferences. Second, suspects may lie and c onc oct false alibis. Lies, if
believed, may th row the police off the scent, but if police disprove lies, trial
juries will be more likely to c onvict the lying suspects . Seidmann and Stein
conclude that silence is often the optimal ch oice for guilty suspects ifjuries
9
are forbidden to infer guilt from defendants ' silence. Thus, they reason,
guilty suspects will remain silent while innocent suspects will exculpate
1°
themselves. Knowing that guilty defendants will remain silent, they argue,
juries and police can trust innocent defendants' truthful alibis and therefore
will free them.

11

Seidmann and Stein focus on only two options that guilty suspects h ave:
they can lie or remain silent. But suspects h ave a third option, namely telling
the truth. Seidmann and Stein dismiss this option as irrational. They believe
that "[a] typical suspect confesses to a crime only when confronted with
evidence that he believes to be i rrefutable or when offered a tempting deal
1�
by the police or the prosecution ."
Furthermore, they claim, "in most
I:l
criminal cases, the premium for c onfession is negligible." By this logic, few

6.

Seiclmann & Stein,

7.

!d. at 436-37.

8.

!d. at '157-38.

9.

!d. at 466-70.

supra note

1, at 434-36.

1 0.

!d. at 445-48.

11.

Seidmann & Stein,

12.

ld.at450-51.

13.

!d. at 466; see a/.so id. at 469 (stating that those who confess "enjoy [a] small but positive

remission of sentence");

irl.

Slljna note 1, at 433-34,457-61,468-70.

at 470 (making exp licit the "assumption that confessions secure"

not large reductions in sentence but only ''small" ones).
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guilty suspects should ever confess, because confessing will only hurt
cases at trial.
Unfortunately, this theory does not fit the facts. Many suspects, w hen
questioned, do admit their guilt. One recent study sh owed that more th an
14
Other studies h ave
42% of questioned suspects incriminate themselves.

found that between 32% and 67% of th ose questioned incrim inate
15
Seidmann and Stein's theoretical model simply does not·
themselves.

account for the real world.

Why do guilty suspects confess? The many suspects who know that they,
·
will be convicted in any event gain important benefits from early.

confessions.

First,

guilty

suspects

gain important

psychic

benefits

by

confessing and expressing contrition and remorse for their wrongs. 16
Second, prosecutors may downgrade or drop charges as a reward for

sympathetic defendants wh o confess early. Likewise, courts may s h ow extra 1
·
mercy at sentencing to those who confess and attempt to help the
17
government early on. And early confessions resolve cases m ore quickly. By
confessing and pleading guilty early, suspects who are detained pending trial
speed up their post-sentence moves to long-term confinement. Because the

the

14.
Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police lnteiTogation in the 1990s: An Ernpi1 ica l Study of l1
Effects of Miranda, 43 UCU.\ L. REv. 839, 869 tbl.4 (199fi) (reporting the results of an

empirical study that showed that 42.2% of questioned suspects admit guilt even after Mi.,-anda,
and that none of this incrimination was the result of locking a suspect into a false alibi).
15.

Richard A. Leo, In s ide the lntenogation Room, 86 J. CR!M. L. & CRI:\IINOLOCY 266, 280,

280 tbl.7 (1996) (reporting the result5 of an empirical study in which 24.18% of those
questioned made full confessions, 17.58% made partial admissions, and 22.53% made other
incriminating statement5, for a total of 64.29%, and noting that other studies had reported
rates of incriminating statements of 32%, 38%,46%,50%,51%, and 67%).
16.

See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Cnme, Confession, and the CounseloT-at-Law: Lessons from
35 Hous. L. REV. 327, 329, 331, 364-67 (1998) (noting that confessions may help
criminal defendants to achieve "forgiveness, reconciliation, and a clear conscience" as well as
peace, joy, and redemption, but that many criminal defense lmvyers ignore clients' desires to
achieve these goals by confessing); Stephanos Bibas, Harm on iz ing Substantive Climinal Law Values
and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 COR:\ELL L. REV.
(forthcoming July 2003) (manuscript at 46-69, on file with the Jowa Law Review) (discussing
how confessions can lead to repentance, catharsis, reform, and forgiveness in defendants,
victims, and communities and how pleas without confessions short-circuit these processes); see
also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 167 (1990) (Scalia, j., dissenting) (noting that
confessions are good not only for society but also for guilt:;- defendants, because confessions are
virtuous and promote both 'justice and rehabilitation" (internal quotation marks omitted));
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,538 (1966) (\Vhite,J., dissenting) (noting that confession, far
from hurting the suspect, "may provide ps;·chological relief and enhance the prospects for
rehabilitation'').
Dostoyevsky,

17.

See U.S. SENTE'.;C!i'\G GL'IDELI:\ES lVL-1.:\L\L� 3£1 1(b), application notes

l

(h), 6 (2001)

(making timeliness of confessions a criterion for sentence redttctions); George E. Dix, Promises,

Confessions, a nd H'ayne LaFave's Bright Line Rule A n a (n is, 1993 U. ILL. L. RE\·. 207, 247 (1993)
(explaining that sentencing judges may give greater ll'eight to prompt cooperation, as earlier
cooperation is more likely to lead to additional information in time for officers to use it,
whereas late cooperation may be redundant once police have developed other sources of
information independently).
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used for pretrial detention are often less pleasant than the p risons used
18
·for l onger-term incarceration, defendants may prefer quick resolutions.

Early confessions bring p articular benefits in multi-defen dant cases
g from car-theft rings to fraud conspiracies to robbery gangs to

dru g cartels. For example, a low-level drug courier who is arrested may
and agree to cooperate in the investigation of her co-conspirators.
t

to make it work, the courier must admit guilt, and often she must do so
19
t away. Once she does so, she may be able to deliver the drugs she was
·

g to the intended recipient, giving police surveillance valuable

evidence and perhaps leading to more arrests. She may also place recorded
teleph one conversations with o thers in the organization. She may even wear
body recorder and microphone to tape-record meetings in person, acting
a5

a government informant for some time. All of these activities will earn her

substan tial credit come sentencing time, and they are virtually the only way
�0
that she can reduce the otherwise stiff drug penalties.

MALCOLM M. FEELEY &

EDW ARD L RLBE\, j LDIC:lAL

POLICY MAKJ'lG A'lD THE MODERi\

1 11 (1998); see aLso HU!AN RIGHTS
WATCH, PRlSG:'.J CO'lDIT!ONS 1:\ THE Ll:\ITED ST.-\ TES 18-22 (1991) (noting that some jails are
overcrowded, and because they are for short-term incarceration they often lack recreation
facilities, windows, privacy, and classitication of inmates). Large dormitory-style jail cells are
particularly unpleasant and make it easier for inmates to attack and sodomize each other. ld. at

.STATE:

HOW

THE COURTS REFOR\!ED A\!ERICA'S PR!SO:\S

26.

.

19.
See Dix, supm note 17, at 247 ("For a variety of reasons, and perhaps especially in dntg
cases, officers may be \villing to 'deal' with a suspect only if the suspect is willing to deal
immediately, with the otlicers, and without consulting counsel or others," because such deals
are timely, flexible, and preserve contidentiality.); see also j AM ES Q. WILSO:\, THE
INVESTIGATORS: MAI\AGI:\C F.B.I. ,\ND !\.\RC:OTICS AGEYfS 7 3-7 4 (1978) (explaining that the
hours between arrest and arraignment are the critical time during which agents are best able to
flip suspects and use them in ongoing investigations).

The confession is an important prelude to cooperation for three reasons. First, it is
simply implausible to imagine someone who simultaneously denies guilt while going through
the motions of continuing to take part in the denied crime. Second, if the courier is denying
her innocence, she may avoid discussing her incriminating knowledge during taped
conversations. This would greatly reduce the likelihood that she would elicit incriminating
statemenl� from others and that she would steer the police towards evidence that incriminates
others as well as herself. Indeed, her stilted conversations might even tip off her co-conspirators
that something 11·as \\Tong. Third, confession is central to airing the facts in preparation for
testimony at trial. Cooperating witnesses must be prepared to testify fully about the crime and
their roles in it. To demonstrate candor, a IV·itness must come completely clean before the jury.
The witness is even more credible if she confessed her involvement right awav to the police.
20.
18 LT.S.C. § 3SS3(e) (2000) (authorizing sentencingjuclges to depart below manclatmv
minimum sentences for defendants who furnish "substantial assistance in the investigation or
prosecution" of other criminals, on rnotion of the government); U.S. SE�TE'lC!:\C GUDELI:\ES
MAJ'iUAL § 5K1.l (200 1) (authorizing departures from federal sentencing guidelines for
defendants who provide "substantial assistance in the itwestigation or prosecution of' other
criminals, on motion of the government); Frank 0. Bownan, Ill, Departing Is Such Sweet Sorrow:
A Year of Judicial RnJOII on "Substantial Assistance" DejJm1urrs Follows a Decade of Prosecuto1ial
lndiscij;line, 29 STETSO:\ L. RE\'. 7, 14-lS (1999) (explaining that "for most defenclanlo; virtually
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If instead she remains silent, s he l oses this chance to cooperate. And if
she decides to change her mind later, perhaps on an attorney ' s advice, it
may be too late. After arrest, she may s tay in j ail for some time until she is
arraigned and makes bail (or not). By that time, others may h ave noticed
her absence, know or suspect that she h as been arrested, and refuse to deal
wi th her. The scheduled time for delivery of the drugs may long since h ave
passed, raising suspicions and thwarting plans for a controlled delivery
under police surveillance. O r the government may no longer want her help,
h aving found a more c ooperative courier or other sources o f information in
21
the meantime. In the fast-paced world of investigation and c ooperation,
she who hesitates is lost.
Seidmann and

Stein' s

theoretical

model

does

not

reflect

these

substantial benefits of confessions in its fac tual assumptions. Nor do
Seidmann and Stein adjust their model to account for the o bserved facts:
widespread c onfessions, cooperation, and guilty pleas . The point is that
many suspects who can expect to be found guilty confess because they know
that going to trial, let alone winning at trial , is not

realistic.

They

understandably prefer the bird in the h and (the benefits of c onfession) to
the bird in the bush (a slim chance of an acquittal at trial). Suspects are too
savvy to pin all their h opes on trials that exist only in theory.
II.

GUlLTY SUSPECTS LIE

Suppose that telling the tru th is not an attractive option, perhaps
because the evidence of guilt is sh aky. The suspect can c h oose to lie or to
remain silent . Despite the right to remain silent, a plurality of suspects
choose to lie. As Seidmann and Stein acknowledge, "suspects do not exercise

the right to silence very often either at interrogation or at trial. ,n The data

they c ite show that roughly 80% to 90% of questioned suspects do not
23
invoke the righ t to silence. O ther data indicate that lvfimnda warnings and
21
the right to silence reduce c onfessions by between 4% and 16% . • Roughly
46% of questioned suspects deny guil t, almost four times as many as remain
2'
Unless the police are formally interrogating h u ge numbers of
silent.
innocent suspects , one must conclude that guilty suspects prefer lies to

the only ground on which a departure from these stiff sentences might plausibly be based is
'substantial assistance' to the government").

supra note 17, at 247.
22. Seidmann & Stein, supra note 1, at 448.
23. Cassell & Ha)man, sujJra note 14, at 869 tbl. 4 (reporting results of empirical study
showing that only 12.1% of suspects questioned invoked their (Vfiranda rights); Leo, supra note
21.

See Dix,

15, at 275 tbl.2 (reporting results of an empirical study showing that only 20.88% of suspects
invoked Aliranda rights).
24.

Seidmann & Stein, sujJra note l, at 500-01 (collecting statistics).

25.

Cassell & Hayman, supra note 14, at 869 tbl.4 (reporting that 45.7% of suspects

questioned denied guilt or made other non-incriminating statements).
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silence. Some suspects remain silent, indicating that silence 1s at times
advantageous, but many more find it beneficial to lie.
Seidm ann and Stein acknowledge that guilty suspects h ave incentives to
lie. If the police believe the lie, the suspect may divert police attention to
other suspects. They may also release the suspect fro m custody. The suspect
can then set up an alibi, destroy incriminating evidence, or intimidate
26
The suspect can even flee the jurisdiction. Conversely,

potential witnesses.

if the suspect remains silent, the police and prosecution will infer his guilt
27
and focus on developing evidence against him . In other words, lies may
throw police off the scent, whereas silence will convince them of guilt .
Despite these compelling incentives to lie and t h e revealed preferences
of suspects, Seidmann and Stein do not m odify their theory to fit the
observed facts . Instead, they maintain that "silence is usually the better
28
They reason that while silence causes pretrial damage, this
choice ."
damage is much less serious than the damage a false alibi will likely cause at
9
trial . 2 They argue that m ost suspects act irrationally in talking to the police
30
because they irrationally underestimate the likelihood of h arm at trial.
Seidmann and Stein are inconsistent. Their assertion of irrationality
conflicts with their overall "rationalist approach" and their treatment of
31
rationality as "the norm."
If 80% to 90% of suspects are behaving
irrationally, not much is left of Seidmann and Stein' s elegant theoretical
rational-actor m odel . Or perhaps it is Seidm ann and Stein who are being
irrational. The revealed preferences of the 80% to 90% who do not remain
silent belie Seidmann and Stein's bare assertion of irrationality. Most of
these 80% to 90% are street-savvy, experienced recidivists who know h ow the
32
criminal justice system works. Their behavior sh ould m ake us question
whether lying to the police is such an irrational move after all.
Indeed, lying to the police is often rational. The flaw in Seidmann and
Stein' s theoretical model is their assumption that pretrial investigations are
much less important than trials. As a rule, cases are won or lost during the
investigation stage. A credible lie may divert police suspicion during an
investigation and free the suspect from jail immediately. If the suspect does

26.

Seidmann & Stein,

27.

ld. at 444, 446.
!d. at 448.
ld. at 447-48.
ld. at 448.

28.
29.
30.

3 1.
32.

Seidmann & Stein,

See

Leo,

supra

supra note

l , at 447.

sujna note 1, at

450.

note 15, at 275 (noting that 58% of those questioned had felony

records, 29% had misdemeanor records, and 13% had no records);

cf id.

at 287 tbl.9 (noting

that 69.90% of those with felony records, 89.36% of those with misdemeanor records, and
91.67% of those with no criminal records waived their

Mi·randa

rights). While experience \\�th

the criminal justice system does reduce the percentage of suspects who speak to the police
somewhat,
speak.

a

solid majority of the most experienced criminals still think it is in their interests to

[2003]
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not divert suspicion, however, the investigation is likely to be the end of the
story. Police assume that suspects remain silent because they are guilty and
cannot exculpate themselves, in contrast to the many defendants who
already proffer alibis. Police and prosecutors have strong incentives and
pressures to secure large numbers of convictions. So, once a suspect remains
silent and thereby confirms the police's suspicion that he is guilty, police use
many tools to find more proof of guilt. The police can conduct surveillance
of every move he makes. They can show him to witnesses in line-ups or
photographic arrays. They can target his friends and associates and pressure
them to give evidence against him. Prosecutors can subpoena his telephone
records, bank statements, and credit card bills for evidence. They can keep
track of the telephone numbers he calls and the mail he receives, and can
perhaps wiretap telephones to record incriminating conversations. In short,
once

the

government

focuses

on

a

target,

it

can

often

build

an

overwhelming case. This helps to explain why only about 1% of felony
33
defendants are acquitted at trial; most plead guilty. Most suspects are right
not to worry about damaging their cases at trial, because their chances of
going to trial and winning are so small.
Put another way, Seidmann and Stein's claim is that the right induces
guilty suspects to remain silent, because they know that juries will not infer
guilt from silence (though police will). Without a right to remain silent, they
claim, guilty suspects would concoct (credible) false alibis, leading juries to
34
discount innocent suspects' alibis. But why would those who could concoct
credible alibis refrain from doing so, if alibis are so rarely refuted (as argued
below)? The argument further supposes that guilty suspects care most about
maximizing their chances of winning at trial, when in fact trials are rare and
guilty suspects know it. Because trials are won or lost at the investigative
stage, few cases are worth pushing to a trial where the no-adverse-inference
rule might make a difference. Seidmann and Stein's entire argument hinges
on the inferences that juries might draw at trial, when in 94% of cases there
will never be a trial.
vVhile silence is often not as attractive an option as Seidmann and Stein

33.

See

supra note 5 (collecting statistics). While it is true that a fraction of cases is

dismissed, the possibility of dismissal is hardly a reason for suspects

to

remain silent instead of

lying. First, on Seidmann and Stein's model, the right to remain silent confers an added benefit
only at trial, by preventingjuries from drawing ach·erse inferences. Before trial. police and other
actors are free to draw adverse inferences from suspects' silence, regardless of 1\'hether there is
a right

to

remain silent. If the case never makes it

w

trial, there is no jur)' to draw an adYerse

inference, and the right has no effect. Thus, the right protects g u il r y suspects only in the fewer
than 6% of cases that go to trial; it has no effect on dismissals. Second.

as

the text goes on

w

note, false alibis in practice do not come back to haunt suspects. If anything, plausible lies are
more likely to lead the government not to charge or
contrast,

silence

determination to convict.
34.

to

dismiss cases \\'here guilt is doubtful. In

would only conlirm the defendant's

Seidmann & Stein,

sujnn note

1, at 465-70.

guilt and steel

the

goYernment's
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make it out to be, lies are even more attractive than they suggest. Lies are
not nearly as damaging as Seidmann and Stein assume, because they are
unlikely to be disproved. A recent empirical study found that while 79 out of

173 interrogated suspects made non-incriminating statements, not a single

35
suspect was locked into a demonstrably false alibi. Once again, Seidmann
and Stein fail to modify their theory to reflect these facts.
Suspects in white-collar crimes have particular reasons to lie instead of
remaining silent in anticipation of trial. For reputable business executives
and professionals,

merely being indicted is enough to besmirch their
36
reputations and harm their livelihoods. Avoiding indictment is the name of
the game, and they will do whatever it takes-either telling the truth and
making a quick deal or lying to divert suspicion. Silence is often the absolute
worst option, as it \vill lead not only to indictment but also to search warrants
and subpoenas. This further investigation will almost certainly turn up
incriminating evidence, because white-collar cases turn on business records
:17
and paper trails.
True, lying has its risks. The police may be able to disprove lies,
especially grandiose alibis, which vvill hurt the suspect. As noted, however,
this outcome is not nearly as common as Seidmann and Stein suppose.
Seidmann and Stein use a hypothetical example in which an eyewitness
remembers seeing the suspect at some time, but is confused about whether
it was

at the crime scene or

on

another

occasion.

To counter this

identification evidence, the guilty suspect can guess at another, innocent
occasion on which the witness says she might have seen the suspect. The
suspect's only alternatives are to guess at the alternative possibility voiced by
'1K
the witness, or else stay silent.
Seidmann and Stein's hypothetical is far-fetched. Most lies are much
more mundane and general, such as: "I didn't do it. I have no idea what
you're talking about. I've never seen that guy before." The government
cannot use this lie against the defendant, because it is impossible to prove its
falsehood without independently adducing sufficient evidence of guilt. Or
the lie may be specific, as where a suspect counts on his mother or girlfriend
to say he was at home during the crime. Granted, the lie may not work, as
the police are skeptical of self-serving statements. But the payoff for a
successful lie is high and the downside is low. Given the low rates of acquittal
and the massive benefits for pleading guilty, going to trial usually is not a

35. Cassell & Hannan. sufmt note 14, at 869 tb1.4.
36. SeP Pamela H. Bucy, \-\7Jite Collar Crime and the Role of Defense Counsel, 50 ALA. LA\N. 226,
228 (1989) (explaining that the very returning of indi ctments hurts white-collar defendants,
even if thev are later acquitted, because indictments cloud professional reputations, alert
potential civil plaintiffs

to

possi ble improprieties, and subject defendants to financial and

emotional stress).

37.
38.

Seeid.at231.

Seiclmann & S te in,

supra note

l,

at

462-64.
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realistic option.

39

Thus, suspects do not care much about how lies might
hurt them at trial. Most suspects have only two real options: either deflect
suspicion by lying or plead guilty. In short, lying is an entirely rati

gamble for many, many suspects. A few who cannot concoct good lies wiij
remain silent, but this modest amount of silence is not enough to lead juries
to trust all alibis.
Moreover,

Seidmann

and

Stein

divide

cases

into

three

compartments: those with strong, intermediate, and weak evidence . The
y
then reason about whether guilty and innocent suspects are better off
40
remaining silent or protesting their innocence in each type of trial.
trial-focused approach is unrealistic. Sometimes, interrogators \vill confron t
a suspect with overwhelming incriminating evidence or arrest her
handed. Very often, however, suspects must decide whether to speak long
41
before they know the evidence against them, or in the face of bluffing by
interrogators. Suspects often do not know as of the time of the interrogation
whether the evidence will be strong, intermediate, or weak if and when the·'
case gets to trial. Thus, they cannot make the detailed trial forecasts that ·
Seidmann and Stein expect them to make. What they do know is that an

·

immediate lie can throw the police off the scent, and in practice many use_:· ·
this option.
Seidmann and Stein's entire argument depends on the premise that..
"many guilty suspects opt for silence instead of lies, " so that juries will
'

�

·
'

assume that those who talk are tellmg the truth. - But m a world where few
0

defendants find it advantageous to press on to jury trials, convincing the
police matters far more than convincing the jury. This explains why 80% to .

90% talk. And in a world where 80% to 90% of suspects talk, talk is cheap.
Some guilty

suspects

choose

to

remain

silent,

but

many

more

talk,

mimicking innocent defendants and so leading juries and police to distrus t:

�

all alibis.
The 1 0 % to 20% of suspects who remain silent may benefit from the

right to silence, but the spillover effect of this silence is negligible. Doubtless .
some of these silent suspects are guilty. Innocent suspects may also remain
silent, however, either because they lack strong alibis or because they fear

39.

See

supra note 5 (coll ecting statistics o n rates of acqui ttals and c o nvictions at trial ) ;

Stephanos B ibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and

Sentence

Enhancements in a Won',:l of Guilty Pleas, 1 1 0

YALE L j . 1 0 9 7 , 1 1 50, 1 1 5 3-54 ( 200 1 ) .
Lies m ight also b e relevant if they made plea bargai ns less favorable ( o r if, conversely,
s i l e nce made plea bargains more favorable) . But give n that l i es are so rarely disproved, there is
l i ttle reason to th i n k that they l e ad to p l e a bargain s that are harsh e r than those fol lowing
silence.
40.

Sei drnann & Ste i n , supra n o t e 1 , at 467-70.

41 .

See, e.g , N J .

Cr. R. 3 : 1 3-3 ( b ) ( explai n i n g that discovery is n o t ordinarily due unti l

fourteen days after i n d i c tment) .
42.

Seiclmann & Stei n , supra n o te 1 , at 433.

TO REJ\!IAIN SILENT HELPS ONL Y THE GUlL TY
THE RIGHT

'

43 1

police and want lawyers to protect them. Seidmann and Stein do not
this possibility, let alone quantify it. Since the pool of silent suspects
con sider
and some of those silent suspects may be innocent, silence tells
ge,
is n ot lar

little about the bulk of suspects who speak. One can draw only the
43
weake s t of inferences that the 46% of suspects who deny guilt are i nnocent.
-�,
....uF·r ,

j urors are n ever told to trust testifying defendants. Nor will they

.read the Harvard Law Review and find out that they are supposed to trust
alibis, at least in cases of intermediate strength. On the contrary, jury
instrUctions warn them that witnesses, including defendants, may shade
44
·their testimony out of bias and i n terest in the outcome. And common

" sense teaches jurors not to trust self-servi n g alibis. In sum, when guilty and
suspects alike talk frequently, jurors can not infer that talk is

III. CONCLUSION
Seidmann and Stein's effort to use game theory to model i nterrogation
·
·

is elegant, but it proceeds from abstract premises that are often erroneous or
not nuanced enough. They fail to found it on the real-world experience of
suspects, police, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. Rather than adjusting

their model to fit and account for observed empirical facts, they disregard
inconvenient

data.

And

their

premises,

like

those

of

most

criminal

procedure scholarship, are stuck in the mythical world of jury trials. Their
too-abstract methodology, coupled with flawed premises, leads them to a

43. See supra note 2 5 . If one assumes that s i l e n t suspects are di sp r o porti o na tely guiltv, and
··if one assumes that j ur o rs somehow know this, and if one assumes that lay ju ro rs are aware o f

.

and re spond to fi n e gradati o n s i n pool i n g phenomena, and ij one assumes t h a t jurors wi l l draw

inferences in favor of tes ti fyi ng defe n dants but n o t adverse i n feren ces against silent d e fe n dants,

perhaps a few j urors might the o r e ti cal ly trust alibis sl i gh tly more, b u t any such e ffe c t seems

exceedingly speculative and negligib l e . Any such effe c t i s a far cry from the large, si g n i fican t
effect c l aim ed by

Se i d m an n

and Stein. And to the exte n t that jurors draw favorable i n fe rences

;
' from alibis, th ey are l i k e ly to draw correspondingly u n favorable i n ferences from s i l e n c e . This
would undercut any i n ce n tive to remain s i l e n t and so i n duce s i l e n t suspects to speak, which
would un ravel t h e s u p p os ed anti-pooling e ffect.

44.

Seidmann and Ste i n assume wi thout argument that j u ries know t h ey sh o ul d trust alibis

becau se they some how know th at guil ty defendants will re main s i l e n t . :;ee
:
Seidmann &

supra note

I , at 469

( " [T] he j u ry dra\VS

Ste i n .

a favorable i n fe rence from anv ex cui patory statement. " ) .

This assum p ti o n does n o t square with my ovv11 ex pe r i e n c e s a s a federal prosecutor. I n various
Westlaw searches through the j u ry-i nstructions da tabase U l-ALL) on October 5 , 2002, 1 fou n d
n o t a single pattern j u ry i nstruction t o that effect. N o r would any j ur o r wi th c o m mo n sense
assume that a d e fendant must b e telli n g the tru t h .

On

t h e c o n t r arY , j udges i nstruct j u ri e s to

consider a witness's stake in the o u tcome in decidi n g whether or not to belie,·e that witness's
testi m ony, and some e x p l i c i tly tell j u rors to j udge defe n dants' tes timony by the same srandarcls.

COM�!. 0"-i PATTER'< j L'R\" lNSTRLCTIO"iS, D IST. j L' DCES ASS ' '\ Or THE FIHH CI RCL' IT. PATTER'\
jURY INSTRLC I I O"'S ( C ri m i nal Cases) § 1 .08 (200 1 ) ; Cm!\1. 0'\ P -\TTER:--.: .Jn.\· 1:\STRLCTIO'\S,
DIST. jl'DGES AsS' '< O r Ti lE SEVENTH C IRCU IT, FEDER:\L CRI\li"io\ L Jl'R\' 1'\STRL CTI00,"S OF THE
SEVENTH CI RCL'IT § 1.03 ( 1999) ; COM'vl. 0'\ PATTER'\ j L R\' l'\STRL'CTIOi'\S, DI ST . _) L DCES ASS ' \! or
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT, PATTERL\ CRI\I l'\AL JL'RY lNSTRL!CTIONS § 7 . 02B ( 199 1 ) .
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conclusion a t odds with e mp irical fact. I h ave written elsewhere about the
4'
need to move past th e outdated fixation on trials. ' Seidmann and Ste i n 's
article exemplifies this fixation with abstrac tions and trials. Ins tead of
foc using exclusively on trials, sch olars must analyze the myriad other real
world options that suspects h ave . Ofte n , deflecting susp i c i o n , c ooperating
with th e gove rn m e n t, or otherwise stri ki ng a favorable plea bargain will b e
m u c h more attractive t h a n trial . T h u s , m a n y talk and few s tay sile n t.
This

messy reality lacks

the

theoreti cal

elegance

and

beauty

of

Seidmann and Stein's model. For exampl e , i t requires exploring the
i n c e n tives to confess created by s tiff d rug s e n te nces and the Sen te ncing
Gui deli n es ' cooperation and acceptance-of-responsibility provisions. B u t the
messy model explains the data much be tter than the e le ga n t one does.
Beauty is not always truth , nor tru th , beauty. It is time to s top assuming that
eve ry criminal case ends in a j ury trial and to heed fac ts that unde rcut
th eories . V\7e must scrutinize h ow police, prosecutors, defense counsel, and
suspects respond to multifari o us i n c e n tives i n th e real world and tailor our
th eories to fit these facts.

45.

Sn: Ri bas,

s ujHa n o t e 39.

